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INTRODUCTION
According to regulation experts, the United States securities regulation
system is due for a complete overhaul.' Although the regulatory scheme is
not the sole source of recent economic turmoil, Americans watching their
investments decline in value may blame those regulators who have as-
sumed the mantle of investor protection. 2 The precise level of reform that
is to come is still uncertain and sweeping new legislative programs could
have unexpected consequences going forward. Simultaneous with calls for
reform of the securities laws and regulations, there is growing attention
among scholars of administrative law towards a school of thought called
"New Governance." 3  This Note analyzes a few potential avenues for
change in United States securities regulation in light of the descriptive and
normative claims of New Governance theory.4
This Note analyzes the implications of New Governance theory as it re-
lates to a group of proposals to reform U.S. securities regulation. New
Governance does not have one definition, and alternate terms such as "re-
flexive law, soft law, collaborative governance, democratic experimental-
ism, responsive regulation, outsourcing regulation . . . [and] meta-
regulation" 5 are used to describe similar phenomena. Unless specifically
used in the context of Securities and Exchange Commission policy deter-
minations, "securities regulation" in this Note is intended to indicate the
aggregate of all legal protections of the interests of securities holders, under
federal and state laws and regulations, as well as case law and emerging in-
ternational norms. The only way to apply and evaluate New Governance
theory is to contextualize the rules governing securities issuance and ex-
change in light of all stakeholders and policymakers.
Part I of this Note describes New Governance theory in both descriptive
and normative terms and gives an account of how New Governance solu-
tions are already integrated into the U.S. securities regulation regime. Part
II of this Note describes reform proposals in two important securities regu-
1. See Harvey Pitt, Bringing Financial Services Regulation into the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 319 (2008) ("The system cries out for serious change, which
begs the question: Where do we go from here?").
2. See Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality,
78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 795-96 (2000).
3. See generally Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Re-
form, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139 (2006) (describing new governance in the context of
healthcare).
4. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 863 CONN. L. REV. 863, 869 (2006).
5. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MnNN. L. REV. 342, 346 (2004) (internal citations omit-
ted).
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lation areas: executive compensation and financial reporting. Part III of
this Note analyzes the extent to which the discussed reforms incorporate
New Governance principles, weighs these reforms against traditional legal
and policy values, and advocates, in particular, for expanded application of
New Governance in the field of financial reporting.
I. BACKGROUND ON NEW GOVERNANCE THEORY AND U.S. SECURITIES
REGULATION
Part I of this Note explores the common core of a group of theories col-
lectively referred to as New Governance. These theories are united in
questioning "the false dilemma between centralized regulation and deregu-
latory devolution." 6 Part I.A proposes that these theories are best under-
stood in the most general terms, applying to novel non- and quasi-
governmental organizations, federal and state governments, and the stake-
holders themselves. Part I.B argues that New Governance is best under-
stood as a general theory of norm formation by giving examples of how the
so-called command-and-control regulatory systems that comprise U.S. se-
curities regulation already incorporate New Governance principles.
A. Defining and Understanding New Governance
As a still-nascent theory of administrative law, New Governance evades
a single definition. Definitions of New Governance fit into two categories:
some focus on differences between New Governance and traditional forms
of government, while others focus on the increasing role that non- and
pseudo-state actors play in policy formation. The "New Governance
model" proposed by Orly Lobel is illustrative of the first category, as Lobel
defines New Governance mainly by what it is not. For Lobel, New Gov-
ernance "supports the replacement of the New Deal's hierarchy and control
with a more participatory and collaborative model."7 Robert Ahdieh takes
the second approach. Rather than defining a theoretical movement in op-
position to current administrative institutions, Ahdieh's treatment of New
Governance begins with an examination of the problems stemming from
"cross-jurisdictional interaction among regulatory entities," 8 and develops
an explanation of how these interactions can "[offer] an effective mecha-
nism for gradual, incremental shifts in law and norms, rather than catastro-
6. Id. at 343.
7. Id. at 344.
8. Ahdieh, supra note 4, at 863.
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phic changes." 9 The distinction between the two strategies for defining
New Governance is important because it has consequences for policy de-
terminations ancillary to the implementation of a New Governance admin-
istrative scheme. The proper role of traditional sovereign states in a New
Governance scheme depends on whether New Governance is a new process
of norm formulation, or if it is merely a new strategy for the formulation
and implementation of the policy objectives of the State.
The distinction between the Lobel and Ahdieh definitions should not be
overemphasized. Lobel recognizes that her "Renew Deal" vision is an
amalgamation of "scholarly theories including . . reflexive law, soft law,
collaborative governance, democratic experimentalism, responsive regula-
tion, outsourcing regulation, . . . [and] meta-regulation .... ,,10 Although
Lobel makes certain debatable claims about New Deal regulation, broadly
characterizing it as command-and-control regulation," Lobel recognizes
that a "statutory mandate may be a first step in the constitution of a govern-
ance model."' 2  Thus, even when New Governance is understood as a
"third way between state-based, top-down regulation and a single-minded
reliance on market-based norms,"'13 rather than a "proceduralization" of ex-
isting, but opaque, influence on policy formation, there are no precise
boundaries between the old and the new.
The line of distinction between old and new governance-and thus an
understanding of the essence of New Governance-is further complicated
by scholarship recognizing the importance of traditional nation-states to the
orderly formation and operation of the New Governance solutions.' 4 The
fact that old and new may coexist does not, however, imply that the new is
subsumed within the old.' 5 Even in recognition of the importance of their
centralized organizations, New Governance institutions are distinct from
their command-and-control counterparts.' 6
9. Id. at 896.
10. Lobel, supra note 5, at 346 (internal citations omitted).
11. See id at 369.
12. Id. at 451.
13. Id at 443.
14. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation
through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit 13 (Jan.
2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://works.bepress.com/kenneth-abbott/2).
15. This is particularly true in the case of "transnational" governance structures, and in-
ternational governance structures, as in the Tuna/Dolphin Case described in Richard W.
Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We
Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (1999).
16. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 12.
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The regulation of securities provides a unique opportunity for adminis-
trative law scholars to test the boundaries of new and old institutions for
two reasons: first, securities regulation is aided by an abundance of market
data that is constantly generated and scrutinized by market participants; and
second, command-and-control was arguably never the dominant mode of
norm generation in the field of securities regulation. 17 The history of secu-
rities trading gives ample examples, however, where more information did
not yield better information, and consequently did not give rise to better
regulatory policy. 18 Where such market failures occurred, the rules were
not self-sustaining, and therefore required changes. New Governance regu-
lation strategies grant market feedback about the success of a rule a visible
place in discussions leading to policy formation.
In "proceduralizing" the role of market feedback, New Governance can
be seen as expanding the role of the government into the private sector. A
critic may argue that New Governance is a mere cover for deregulatory
policy cloaked in a false mantle of government,' 9 but this criticism, aside
from relying on empirical data about the intentions of New Governance
proponents that are impossible to obtain, assumes that government in-
volvement in problem-solving is an end in itself, rather than a means for
the prevention of failure in private ordering. The most effective criticism
of New Governance focuses on its efficacy. Regulation is necessary pre-
cisely because private ordering does have an impact on persons outside of
individual transactions; a strong argument in favor of regulation is that the
distinction between private and public ordering is artificial.2" A corollary
of the assertion that there is no purely private realm is that there is no
purely public realm either.21 Just as agency costs arise in the context of ex-
ecutive compensation, when policymakers make rules that benefit a narrow
but influential area of society for personal gain, governments introduce
agency costs on those whom they govern. Thus, although the term "market
failure" generally applies in the context of private ordering, New Govern-
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3d ed.
2003).
19. See generally Lobel, supra note 5.
20. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
21. Donna M. Nagy, The SEC at 70: Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The
PCAOB and its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 975, 1030 (2005) ("[T]here
is a growing consensus that expanded privatization has served to blur the distinction be-
tween the spheres of public and private. The blurriness has prompted Professor Jody Free-
man and others to argue that there is 'no purely private realm and no purely public one...
[only] the set of negotiated relationships between the public and the private."') (quoting
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 548 (2000)).
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ance permits more transparent and open procedure to prevent misaligned
incentives between the government and the governed.22
This Note focuses on the implications of New Governance theory for a
sampling of proposals for change in U.S. securities regulation, rather than a
criticism of particular theories, and adopts the most inclusive definition that
still maintains the requisite level of clarity. Such a definition of New Gov-
emance appears in Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal's Strengthening In-
ternational Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Over-
coming the Orchestration Deficit. The definition has four factors:
1) decentralization of "actors and institutions, public and private, into
the regulatory system";
2) reliance on decentralized actors for regulatory expertise;
3) "orchestration ... rather than direct promulgation and enforcement
of rules"; and
4) use of "soft law" over "hard law.' 23
An important aspect of the Abbott/Snidal definition is that it defines
New Governance techniques in terms of implementation by the state.
24
Though some scholars prefer to characterize New Governance in opposi-
tion to the old and centralized government,25 one can also achieve the same
result--or arguably, a better result-by maintaining sovereignty of the
government over matters that New Governance seeks to address, and by re-
stricting the role of the government to enforcing primarily procedural rules.
This view of New Governance is focused on the perspectives of regulated
entities and the people, rather than the perspectives of those involved only
in policy formation. For a regulated entity, the aggregate impact of rules
on the entity's freedom of action is the central focus, regardless of whether
the rules are derived from statutes, regulations, New Governance soft law,
or customary practice in a given industry. The government, however much
it claims to abstain from involving itself in private ordering, whether in the
context of market interactions or compliance with regulations, will ulti-
mately insinuate itself in private ordering when political circumstances
22. Because New Governance requires expanded stakeholder input, New Governance
theory assumes that, through a bargaining process, incentives can be aligned. A failure of a
"solution space" in a New Governance-style negotiation could lead to a breakdown in the
New Governance institution. For an example of the failure of New Governance due to an
impossibility of incentive alignment, see Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails,
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 373-84 (describing the failure of the Montgomery County, Maryland
Citizens Advisory Committee due to substantial disagreement between gay-rights advocates
and Christian public interest law firm Liberty Counsel).
23. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 5.
24. Id. at 4.
25. See Lobel, supra note 5, at 379-80.
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make doing so feasible and politically advantageous. 26 In the short-term, it
makes little difference from the perspective of a regulated entity what the
government's legal justification for such insinuation is, but in the long-
term, the government may be called to account for infringing on the private
sphere when the political conditions that inspired the government to act
dissipate.
The aspiration to improve regulation through New Governance, even
among those who advocate New Governance, is not necessarily as idealis-
tic as Lobel's or even Ahdieh's definition might imply. Some argue that an
important aspect of New Governance is that it delays regulatory decision-
making. Under this view, "strik[ing] when the iron is cold" is necessary in
order to prevent cognitive distortions in the assessment of risk.27 There are
others who view New Governance as merely an excuse not to act at all.28
Whether the effect of implementing New Governance is to materially im-
prove policy decisions, to merely delay decisions to facilitate deliberation
outside of a New Governance system, or to prevent regulation at all is an
empirical question that requires extensive study. Before such systems can
be studied, however, they must actually be implemented on some scale. In
the absence of well-developed empirical data, this Note attempts to make
just the first step in the experiment, by presenting potential methods of im-
plementation. The final step, that of presenting a verdict on the long-term
viability of New Governance regulatory strategies, is currently beyond the
competence of theoretical analysis.
B. Aspects of New Governance in Current U.S. Securities Regulation
Lobel asserts that the "regulatory model promotes adversarial relations,
mutual distrust, and conflict., 29 By contrast, in the Renew Deal's "coop-
erative regime, the role of government changes from regulator and control-
ler to facilitator, and law becomes a shared problem-solving process rather
than an ordering activity."3 In order to properly understand the (potential
for) influence of New Governance on the reform of the U.S. securities
26. See infra Part II.A.2.
27. Richard H. Pildes & Cass Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 62 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
28. See Paul M. Secunda & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Debate, Workplace Federalism, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 28, 34 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/
debate.php?did=17 (Professor Secunda expresses his concern that the "practical result of
this increased call for decentralization, flexibility, and soft law approaches to the workplace
will be the further aggrandizement of employer power at the expense of employees.").
29. Lobel, supra note 5, at 377.
30. Id.
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regulation regime, however, the extent to which the status quo diverges
from Lobel's vision of rigid command-and-control regulation is crucial.
The engine of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "'33 Act") is section five of
that act ("section five"), in that many criminal and civil penalties that arise
under the '33 Act stem from violations of the filing requirement found in
section five.3 ' Although there are numerous exemptions and qualifications,
which have grown with the passage of time, the basic command of the '33
Act is that information must be made available to the government before
securities are sold.32 Although other securities laws and regulations, such
as the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ("the '34 Act") create some substantive restrictions on the business
activities of firms engaged in securities trading, 33 the '33 Act sought to pre-
vent fraud by information dissemination. In terms of enforcement, the '33
Act allows a federal agency to act within its sphere of competence; deter-
mining when a given "prospectus" has been filed is a straightforward bu-
reaucratic issue that requires minimal fact-finding. Although other ancillary
considerations, such as whether the information contained in filed materials
is true, or whether a given exemption applies, section five of the '33 Act is
a regulatory enhancement that encourages corporations to implement the
types of procedures that Abbott and Snidal envision in their discussion of
the application of New Governance techniques by the Federal government.
Given the broad spectrum of rules that could be applied (and that are ap-
plied in the investment company context), no government involvement in
the securities trade could be further from Lobel's characterization of the
New Deal as a set of rigid and centralized norms. 34 To the extent that sec-
tion five allows an investor to make an informed investment choice by
forcing the issuing company to give certain financial information, it argua-
bly reflects Lobel's characterization of New Governance systems as those
which broaden "the decision-making playing field by involving more actors
in the various stages of the legal process." 35 Section five allows market
participants to judge the value of particular enterprises in an informed
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000). The Securities and Exchange Commission describes the
registration of securities required by § 5 as "a primary means of accomplishing [the goals of
the Securities Act of 1933]." United States Securities and Exchange Commission, The Laws
That Govern the Securities Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept.
26, 2009).
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2000).
33. See The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80 (1940); 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c 3-1.
34. See Lobel, supra note 5, at 377.
35. 1d. at 373.
920 [Vol. XXXVI
NEW GOVERNANCE AND SECURITIES
manner, rather than forcing all allocations of capital to be approved by the
government itself.
The '33 Act certainly does not act in isolation. Enforcement of the Act's
goals involves broad participation but does not ensure that the regulatory
scheme as a whole will be decentralized. In practice, even the stricter regu-
latory requirements of other securities laws and regulations harness broad,
participatory methods of private enforcement. Though judicially con-
structed, the right to private action under Rule 1Ob-5 is nonetheless firmly
entrenched within the regulatory regime.36 Broad participation alone does
not define New Governance, but it does reveal a potential avenue for the
further implementation of New Governance-style reforms. Courts of law,
as they decide particular "cases" and "controversies", 37 can be understood
as New Governance institutions despite their old government origins. An
instructive example is the case of Basic v. Levinson,38 which enabled the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis as a powerful tool for enforcing Rule 1Ob-5
claims in the class-action context. Although federal "market regulation"
construed narrowly has its origins in the problems faced in the twentieth
century, 39 the fraudulent sale of securities has always been illegal. 40 The
perceived problem leading to the adoption of more specific regulations in
the run-up to the '33 Act was based on: 1) inability of the states to enforce
cross-jurisdictional fraud; and 2) lack of expertise of the courts in dealing
with complicated fraud.4' Markets have always been "regulated" in the
broad sense that both laws and social norms always impact market partici-
pants' actions, or at a minimum, market participants' assessments of risk
attached with potential actions. Basic signals a return to the common law
experimental application, in which courts interpret the law in light of the
policy consequences that have attended previous applications. To the ex-
tent that these policy decisions are made by unelected judges in a diffuse
judicial system rather than elected officials in a central legislature, Lobel's
characterization of the status quo as highly centralized is open for debate.
36. Steven Thel, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act: Does Old Legislation Matter?, 63
FORDHAM. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1995).
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
38. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
39. See SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 1-38.
40. See generally LOUIS Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 1 (2d ed.
1988).
41. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 42-43 (Seligman describes "lax state corporation laws"
and, in describing courts' inability to deal with corporate fraud, writes that "the ability of the
judiciary to protect non-controlling shareholders from management self-favoritism had been
outrun by a series of statutory innovations that allowed corporate insiders to achieve profits
from securities distributions without risking a fraud suit.").
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In addition to the New Deal and post-New Deal regulatory expansions in
securities regulation that embody New Governance principles in a non-
obvious fashion, there are examples in the U.S. securities regulation regime
of self-consciously New Governance-style arrangements. The potential for
development and adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards
by the SEC will be explored in Part II, but the SEC already has in place the
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System with Canada, which "permits Cana-
dian issuers meeting eligibility criteria to satisfy certain securities registra-
tion and reporting requirements . . . by providing disclosure documents
prepared in accordance with the requirements of Canadian securities regu-
latory authorities."42  Additionally, the role of credit-rating agencies in
shaping investment decisions and regulatory capital requirements provides
another example of the quasi-governmental ordering characteristic of New
Governance theory persisting in the current securities regulatory regime.43
II. AVENUES FOR CHANGE
The origin of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
was a Senate Banking and Currency Committee investigation referred to as
the "Pecora Hearings." 44 These hearings focused on the causes of the
"enormous decline in security prices," which is commonly known as the
Stock Market Crash of 1929. 45 Eighty years later, the country faces a simi-
lar process of introspection about the apparent lack of proper functioning of
the U.S. securities markets. In the summer of 2009, the United States De-
partment of the Treasury released its reform proposal, Financial Regula-
tory Reform, A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and
Regulation. Although the white paper announced several important guid-
ing principles, and specific proposals such as the creation of a new agency
dedicated to consumer protection, 46 the precise direction of regulatory
change is still uncertain. Regardless of the responses to the current "finan-
cial crisis," as long as the public perceives regulation as playing a role in
these failures, the regulations will be subject to change.47 There are, how-
ever, a few procedural and substantive issues that any modem regulatory
42. Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and
Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, 56 Fed. Reg. 30036 (July 1, 1991).
43. See, e.g., David Oakley, Moody's Shakes Up Its Triple A Ratings, FIN. TIMEs, Feb.
11, 2009 at 24.
44. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 1.
45. id.
46. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUN-
DATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 4 (2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf.
47. See Pitt, supra note 1.
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scheme must address, and principles of good government that apply under
.any economic conditions. Part II analyzes two (important) examples of
these unavoidable issues: executive compensation and financial reporting.
A. Executive Compensation Regulation
Executive compensation is an emerging area of concern for securities
regulators. In the 110th Congress, Congressman Barney Frank, Chairman
of the House Financial Services Committee and then-Senator Barack
Obama, proposed the Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act48
(the "Frank-Obama Bill"), a bill that would have given the shareholders of
public corporations a non-binding advisory vote on executive compensa-
tion.49 More recently, changing economic conditions and an increasingly
close relationship between the federal government and financial institutions
led the House to pass H.R. 1586 in March of 2009.50 If passed by the Sen-
ate, H.R. 1586 would impose a 90% tax on certain employees' compensa-
tion where their employer has received more than five billion dollars under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP").5' More extreme measures,
such as the "Pay for Performance Act of 2009, ''52 could allow federal regu-
lation of the bonus compensation of all employees of companies that re-
ceive TARP funds.53
The emergence of executive compensation as a securities regulation is-
sue is understandable because it is superficially straightforward-
comparing the executive's total compensation with either the average em-
ployee's compensation or the company's bottom-line gives a clean statistic
that can easily be reported on television with simple charts and graphs. By
comparison, questions about the efficiency of capital markets or the risks
attached with running a large corporation, and their implications for execu-
tive compensation and insider-trading regulation, 54 are far more complex
and thus inspire less impassioned debate. New Governance theory can be
helpful by facilitating a democratic process that both acknowledges the im-
portance of shareholders as stakeholders and focuses the regulatory power
48. Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2008).
49. See id.
50. An Act to Impose an Additional Tax on Bonuses Received by Certain TARP Re-
cipients, H.R. 1586, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
51. Id. § l(a).
52. Pay for Performance Act of 2009, H.R. 1664, 11 lth Cong. (2009).
53. See id § l(b) ("[A]n entity subject to subsection (e) may not ... pay a bonus ...
without regard to when the arrangement to pay such a bonus was entered into.").
54. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984).
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of the government on difficult issues as opposed to populist rhetoric that
could, in practice, violate public trust in government by destroying share-
holder wealth.
1. Shareholder Voting Rights
New Governance regulatory schemes focus on procedural mechanisms
for ensuring the fair implementation of substantive rules. Unlike pure de-
mocratic political processes, minority views cannot be forced out by artifi-
cially restricting the proportion of representation, but unlike command and
control regulation, New Governance does not require those forming regula-
tions to be entirely impartial and technocratic. Given the goals of stake-
holder inclusion and protection of minority interests, a strategy of giving
shareholders a direct vote on upper-level executive compensation would be
a powerful method of implementing New Governance theory in the U.S.
securities regulation system. As noted above, there has already been sig-
nificant political support for a move to shareholder votes on executive
compensation.
Although shareholder vote on executive compensation ("say on pay")
legislation is a departure from traditional norms of corporate governance, it
is an incremental change rather than a revolutionary one. Limitations in the
U.S. tax code and procedural requirements after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 already effectively restrain how public companies may compensate
their executives, 55 and state laws imposing duties of loyalty, care, and good
faith on the boards of directors of companies restrict executive compensa-
tion, as described below.56 Because say on pay votes are generally advi-
sory (i.e., non-binding), none of the enforcement mechanisms of current
executive compensation limitations would be strengthened merely by pass-
ing say on pay legislation or by a company's voluntary adoption of such
measures. Several companies, either because they independently see the
value in giving shareholders a vote on executive compensation or because
they see the passage of such legislation as inevitable, have already imple-
mented shareholder votes on executive compensation. For example, when
Intel announced in January 2009 that it would provide shareholders with an
advisory vote on executive compensation, fifteen other companies had al-
ready made similar plans and several more companies were considering do-
55. 1.R.C. § 162(m) (2006) (disallowing the deduction of "[c]ertain excessive employee
remuneration").
56. See discussion of executive compensation infra Part II.A.2.
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ing so.57 There is certainly no clear consensus among companies that advi-
sory votes are the best method of regulating executive compensation, and
some have argued that executive compensation is too complicated for
shareholders to make an informed choice.5 8 A possible response to the
criticism that say on pay legislation provides for votes that are merely advi-
sory is that Boards are unlikely to ignore the results. 59
The particular approach taken by the Frank-Obama Bill demonstrates
that a New Governance solution can seamlessly integrate into traditional
regulatory schemes.6" The four-page bill would have added a new subsec-
tion (i) to Section 14 of the '34 Act. Under it, section 14, which governs
the content of proxy materials, 61 would have required any board of direc-
tors to include in its proxy materials for the annual shareholder meeting a
"separate shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives as
disclosed pursuant to the Commission's compensation disclosure rules. 62
Another provision of the Frank-Obama Bill would have required a similar
vote to be included in proxy materials for "an annual meeting of the share-
holders (or a special meeting in lieu of the annual meeting) . . . that con-
cems an acquisition, merger, consolidation, or proposed sale or other dis-
position of substantially all the assets of an issuer" disclosing the contents
of executive compensation related to a specified triggering event.63 Both
the annual and event-driven shareholder votes are limited by similar lan-
guage that makes them non-binding on the board of directors, and explic-
itly avoids creating "any additional fiduciary duty by such board." 64 These
limitations demonstrate that in addition to the policy decision to allow
shareholders to vote on executive compensation, the Frank-Obama Bill is
concerned with avoiding significant disruptions to the surrounding old gov-
emment regulatory system. As noted above, this concern about how a New
57. Phred Dvorak & Joann S. Lublin, Intel Joins Move to Put Pay Plans to Vote, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 27, 2009, at B2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 12330960500362151 1.html.
58. Id. Apple, Inc., now has shifted its position after an options backdating scandal and
an affirmative shareholder vote that they be given an advisory vote on executive compensa-
tion. See Apple, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 46 (Jan. 7, 2009); see also
Apple "Say on Pay" Motion Approved by Shareholders, REUTERS, Apr. 27, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSTRE53Q2HN20090427.
59. See Dvorak & Lublin, supra note 57.
60. See discussion supra Part I.
61. Securities Exchange Act §14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2000).
62. Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. § 2(a)
(2008).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Governance solution interacts with traditional government structures is
common in New Governance literature. 6
5
The Frank-Obama Bill would have also required the SEC to "issue any
final rules and regulations required by the amendments made by" the bill
within one year.66 The involvement of the SEC would be crucial in any
shareholder vote on executive compensation because of the sometimes con-
flicting demands of the securities laws-although they primarily emphasize
the truthful disclosure of information about securities issuers to the public,
the securities laws also prohibit disclosure of certain information about the
issuance of securities without SEC approval. 67  The disclosure require-
ments of the Frank-Obama Bill would have permitted the SEC to govern
what specific material would have been released to the public. As the SEC
has primary responsibility for managing the competing values of full dis-
closure and controlled dissemination of information about the issuance of
securities, these limiting provisions in the bill would have utilized the regu-
latory expertise that already exists rather than reinventing the wheel.
Although the Frank-Obama Bill never passed the Senate, there has been
continued discussion about similar legislation and as noted above, there are
various efforts by companies, activist shareholders, and legislators to enact
similar provisions. 68 The simplicity of the Frank-Obama Bill's mandate
demonstrates the tendency for New Governance-inspired structures to fo-
cus on procedural mechanisms rather than substantive regulation, but this is
not the only form of regulation proposed in the field of executive compen-
sation.
2. Direct Federal Control under the "Reasonability" Test
In time, say on pay legislation may come to be seen as much as a tool of
the board of directors in assessing its own performance and realizing the
attitudes of shareholders as it is a tool of central regulators in making ad-
ministrative determinations about executive compensation. In contrast to
the say on pay reforms through legislation or adoption by public corpora-
tions, a very different group of legislative proposals would empower the
government to make substantive inquiries into the acceptability of execu-
tive compensation. Far from embodying New Governance theory of ruling
by stakeholder consensus, proposals such as H.R. 1586, "An Act to impose
65. See generally Nagy, supra note 21.
66. H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. § 2(b) (2008).
67. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
68. See Carl Icahn, Capitalism Should Return to its Roots, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at
A 11, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123396742337359087.html.
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an additional tax on bonuses received from certain TARP recipients," 69 and
H.R. 1664, "An Act to amend the executive compensation provisions of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 to prohibit unreasonable
and excessive compensation and compensation not based on performance
standards ' 70 each represent a trend distinctly in opposition to say on pay
legislation. Under these laws, politicians rather than shareholders would
make decisions about how managers of public corporations are compen-
sated.
The House of Representatives passed H.R. 1586 on March 19, 2009.
According to legislators in the House debates about H.R. 1586, the com-
pensation of executives of corporations receiving TARP funds was "uncon-
scionable" 7' and as a result, the federal government's taxation power
should be used to reabsorb government "largesse." 72 For employees of
TARP recipients, section l(a) of H.R. 1586 would have imposed an addi-
tional tax liability of ninety percent of the TARP bonus received by the
taxpayer. Section 1(b) of H.R. 1586 defined the TARP bonus as the lesser
of either the value of retention payments or adjusted gross income exceed-
ing $250,000. While utilizing the tax power to avoid constitutional re-
straints on the legislature, 73 the high rate of the tax imposed by H.R. 1586
would have effectively limited the level of compensation that certain public
corporations (TARP recipients) could pay their employees.
Supporters of H.R. 1586 generally characterized the bill as an extraordi-
nary measure, targeted specifically at certain companies that, in a sense,
owed the government after receipt of TARP funds, and yet were "wasting"
taxpayer money.74 Though the members of Congress who supported H.R.
1586 may have had numerous reasons for doing so, including meeting the
demands of their constituents or avoiding moral hazards that attend unde-
served compensation, 75 the bill must be understood in the broader context
of efforts to regulate executive compensation. Currently, the bill has not
passed the Senate and may never become a law, but other proposed legisla-
tion reflects a similar commitment to the establishment of substantive lim-
69. An Act to Impose an Additional Tax on Bonuses Received by Certain TARP Re-
cipients, H.R. 1586, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
70. Pay for Performance Act of 2009, H.R. 1664, 111 th Cong. (2009).
71. 155 CONG. REc. H 3655 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
72. Id.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
74. 155 CONG. REc. H 3655, H 3662 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (statement of Rep. Kra-
tovil).
75. 155 CONG. REc. H 3655, H 3663 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Dingell).
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its on executive pay. For example, H.R. 1664 proposes to prohibit execu-
tive compensation that is "unreasonable or excessive, as defined in stan-
dards established by the Secretary [of the Treasury]" or is a bonus "not di-
rectly based on performance-based measures set forth in standards
established by the Secretary [of the Treasury]. 76 The bill also creates a
Commission on Executive Compensation to conduct studies about execu-
tive compensation and report its findings to the President and the Con-
gress." While the creation of such a commission is consistent with New
Governance theory because it serves an information-gathering function, the
delegation of the authority to determine substantive standards of executive
compensation would permit stakeholders to give input only to the extent
the Secretary of the Treasury voluntarily solicits inputs, or the Administra-
tive Procedure Act and the Constitution require. The bill on its face does
not create substantive standards and it is possible that the Secretary of the
Treasury could implement flexible standards, but the bill does guide the
Secretary's decision by imposing an affirmative "reasonability" require-
ment and by retaining Congressional power to shape the Treasury's pro-
posed standards. 78 The regulation of executive compensation by central-
ized administrative organizations like the United States Treasury applies
only, under current legislation, to those who have received TARP funds,
but the possibility of wider substantive regulation of all publicly traded
corporations in the future is suggested by provisions in the tax code79 and
by much of the rhetoric surrounding efforts to pass "fair" compensation
legislation.8 ° One motive of reasonable compensation legislation is the
need to protect taxpayer investment. 81 Where rhetoric, however, is domi-
nated by "fairness" arguments concerning equality of compensation (as op-
posed to protection of assets), there is no real distinction between regulat-
ing compensation in a public corporation that receives TARP funds and one
that does not.
3. New Governance and the Shift from State to Federal Regulation
Although distinguishable based on their support of the New Governance
theoretical model, both say on pay and reasonable compensation legislation
76. Pay for Performance Act of 2009, H.R. 1664, 111 th Cong. § I(e)(1)(A)-(B) (2009).
77. Id. § 2.
78. Id. § 1.
79. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54.
80. 155 CONG. REc. H 3655, H 3657 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (statement of Rep. Is-
rael).
81. 155 CONG. REC. H 3655, H 3656 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Rangel).
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are examples of a growing trend towards a federal law of corporate govern-
ance, which is only formalistically distinguishable from securities regula-
tion. The federal securities laws generally focus on the dissemination of
information, 82 and rules governing secondary trading,83 with the ultimate
intent to "substitute ... full disclosure for the policy of caveat emptor."84
The regulation of executive compensation is part of a trend that purports to
protect investors by increasing federal level involvement in corporate af-
fairs. 85 Traditionally, state law governed the permissibility of certain busi-
ness decisions. On the state level, the decisions of boards of directors have
been granted wide latitude under the Business Judgment Rule, 86 and cases
have interpreted the Delaware General Corporate Law, which imposes a
duty of loyalty and a duty of care on managers and the boards of directors
of corporations, to require good faith implementation of that rule.87 A de-
cision by Congress to further restrict the ability of a board of directors to
determine appropriate management compensation would imply that Con-
gress believes the state law remedies are not functioning properly. State
law solutions to executive compensation problems have been decided by
courts experienced in corporate governance matters, such as the Delaware
Court of Chancery, and have focused narrowly on resolving agency costs
leading to the misalignment of incentives between the manager and equity-
holders.8 8 The Congressional Record, however, reveals a much broader
area of inquiry, including such factors as executive/lower-level employee
comparability, 89 fairness to taxpayers, 90 and concerns about manager
"greed."91
82. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
83. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144; 17
C.F.R. § 230.144A.
84. See Thel, supra note 36, at 1183.
85. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 §§ 103(a)(1), 401-408, 116
Stat. 745, 755, 785-90 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7213, 7216-7266
(2009)) (introducing various control requirements).
86. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (holding that the
decision of the board of directors will stand where "the decision is one properly before di-
rectors and the motives alleged in the amended complaint [show] no fraud, illegality or con-
flict of interest in their making of that decision").
87. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d. 27 (Del. 2006); In
re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); Sean Griffith, Good Faith Business Judg-
ment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005).
88. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d. 27 (Del. 2006); In
re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54.
89. See 155 CONG. REc. H 3655 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
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Under state law, the problem of management compensation is primarily
viewed through the prism of the complex principal-agent relationship be-
tween the board of directors and company management on the one hand,
and shareholders on the other.92 Even under the requirement of good faith
as a separate cause of action for shareholders, 93 the focus of the good faith
requirement is still fixed firmly on the relationship between shareholders
and management.94 The protections afforded by state law were reduced in
1996, however, under the National Securities Market Improvement Act
("NSMIA"), which restricted the ability for state securities regulators to
conduct "merit review" for many securities. 95 Shareholders already have
many tools at their disposal for protecting their interests under the federal
securities laws and state corporate law, including: voting rights, derivative
suits, SEC regulation, and exchange rules. Still, as mentioned above, the
call for more regulation strongly suggest that these existing methods are not
adequate to meet the political demand for investor protection.
A series of Delaware cases involving the compensation of Walt Disney,
Inc. executive Michael Ovitz demonstrates the inherent limitations of cur-
rent state law. The central issue in these cases was whether the Board of
Directors of Disney violated its duty to act with due care and in good faith
in shaping the compensation package granted to Michael Ovitz. 96 The pro-
visions that cover the responsibilities of the board of directors can be
viewed as a compromise between the two competing roles of the board: to
preserve shareholder assets (i.e., avoid waste) and to engage in profitable
(necessarily risky) business transactions. The decision of how to compen-
sate a particular executive can be analyzed in the same way any other pro-
ject of a firm is analyzed, in terms of the likely return on the corporation's
investment. 97 As any ex ante analysis of a given investment is necessarily
an imprecise exercise, the mechanisms for judging such investment deci-
90. See 155 CONG REc. H 3655, H 3657 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (Statement of Rep.
Israel).
91. See 155 CoNG. REc. H 3655 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (statement of Rep. Polis).
92. See Coase, supra note 20; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54.
93. See Griffith, supra note 87, at 6 ("[Good faith] frees courts from the confines of care
and loyalty in reviewing governance decisions and promises to shift the fulcrum on the scale
balancing the authority of boards and their accountability to courts.").
94. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d. 27 (Del. 2006).
95. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 102,
100 Stat. 3416 (1996).
96. See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 46.
97. See John C. Kelleher & Justin J. MacCormack, Internal Rate of Return: A Cau-
tionary Tale, McKINSEY ON FrN., Summer 2004, at 16-17, available at
http://corporatefinance.mckinsey.com/ downloads/knowledge/mckinseyonfinance/MoF_I
ssue_12.pdf (comparing methods executives use to decide which projects to implement).
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sions tend to be procedural, and focused on the decisional steps taken by
the board of directors and their suitability in terms of conflicts of interest.
Although state regulatory regimes differ, Delaware's corporate law is the
dominant law governing large corporations that would be subject to the say
on pay or reasonable compensation legislation discussed above. 98 Under
current case law, there are three categories of actions which shareholders
may bring against a board that did not fulfill shareholder investment expec-
tations: duty of loyalty,99 duty of care,100 and duty of good faith.' 0 ' In ana-
lyzing the development of compensation in the line of the Disney Cases,
before the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, Professor Sean Griffith
described the law developing in the gaps between traditional duty of care
and duty of loyalty analysis:
[T]he emerging duty of good faith is best understood as a rhetorical de-
vice rather than as a substantive standard. Good faith, in other words, is
not now and is not likely ever to develop into a distinct doctrine of
subrules and multipart tests. Instead, the pattern in the good faith cases is
to raise issues under both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty but,
rather than following either traditional analysis through to a conclusion, to
blend the issues together and, in doing so, identify a basis for liability un-
der the duty of good faith.10 2
Though the statutory mandates of duty of care and duty of loyalty have
been interpreted as chiefly procedural standards for business decisions (in-
cluding in the context of executive compensation), the good faith standard
opens the possibility of substantive regulation because full compliance with
the statutory mandates for the development of an executive compensation
package under state law could nonetheless trigger a violation of the judi-
cially-crafted good faith standard. When a court will choose to find a vio-
lation of good faith will necessarily depend on the court's assessment of the
reasonability of compensation awarded to an executive. For example, if
compensation of a particular executive is at or slightly below the average
98. According to Professor Griffith, Delaware corporate law is "national corporate law."
Sean Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Ju-
risprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 n.3 (2005).
99. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510-12 (Del. 1939).
100. Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
101. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d. 27 (Del. 2006); In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
102. Griffith, supra note 87, at 6.
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level of compensation for executives in the same industry, a court may be
unlikely to find a violation of good faith regardless of the actual value of a
given executive compensation arrangement to the shareholders. The impli-
cations of New Governance on this form of executive compensation regula-
tion is not altogether clear, because while substantive regulation under the
good faith standard would implicate reduced freedom of the boards of di-
rectors to experiment and exercise business judgment, it also implicates in-
creased supervision by courts, which, as mentioned in Part I, can be viewed
as generating policy in line with New Governance theory.'" 3
B. Financial Reporting Regulation
A central policy outcome of the '33 Act and the '34 Act was to force
those who traded securities to make disclosures to the public with supervi-
sion by federal regulators. 10 4 This is reflected in the security registration
requirement of section 5 of the '33 Act and the company registration re-
quirement of section 12 of the '34 Act. Regardless of the intended legisla-
tive purpose behind implementing a regulatory system based on disclosure,
which can be distinguished from merit review of securities offerings under
state blue sky laws, at least one implication of the regulated disclosure sys-
tem is that forcing disclosure aids investors. The requirements for form
and content of disclosure are determined by a combination of statutory and
regulatory provisions, 10 5 but the standard is ultimately determined by the
SEC, which has wide authority to determine what information companies
disclose."0 6 As with executive compensation regulation, there are state
regulatory regimes that govern disclosure of information, both as a matter
of regulatory principles' 0 7 and prevention of fraud even through the use of
half-truths.0 8 Since the NSMIA, however, the ability of state regulators
103. See supra Part I.B.
104. See supra note 31.
105. See Securities Act of 1933 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2000).
106. Id.; see also The Securities Act of 1933 § 10(a)(4) ("[T]here may be omitted from
any prospectus any of the information required under this subsection (a) which the Commis-
sion may by rules or regulations designate as not being necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors."); The Security Act of 1933 § 28 ("The Com-
mission, by rule or regulation, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person,
security, or transaction, or any class of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provi-
sion or provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation issued under this title, to the extent
that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with
the protection of investors.").
107. See, e.g., Uniform Securities Act of 2002 § 306 (2002) (granting state administrators
broad powers to deny or revoke effectiveness of a security registration).
108. Uniform Securities Act of 2002 §§ 501(b), 505 ("It is unlawful for a person to make
... a statement that, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made,
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has diminished in the context of disclosure requirements, at least for large
corporations which issue preempted "covered securities,"'10 9 and although
state fraud actions are a possible source of information disclosure policy,
much of such law would be coterminous with federal regulatory policy, and
the limited ability of state fraud acts to adequately protect investors was
one of the motivating factors in the crafting of the federal securities regula-
tions.11° Compliance with the federal disclosure system is therefore the
primary concern for the vast majority of large issuers.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has generally delegated the
power to form regulations about accounting principles to the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board ("FASB").111 The regulatory system consisting
of SEC regulations and FASB standards, as well as other respected opin-
ions, collectively form and define the United States generally accepted ac-
counting principles ("U.S. GAAP") according to which auditors and execu-
tives certify public companies' financial statements are prepared. 112 To
the extent that U.S. GAAP is defined in a fluid manner by those with pro-
fessional knowledge and by stakeholders, U.S. GAAP is arguably a para-
digm case for implementation of New Governance principles, even if it was
not consciously produced as such.1 13 Developments over time in the geo-
graphic reach and speed of dissemination of information securities markets
have caused a system that was once relatively agile and responsive (com-
pared to the legislative process or even the administrative process under the
Administrative Procedure Act) to become less so. Two possible responses
to changing geographical and technological realties could allow the federal
securities regulations to become more in line with a theoretically perfect
is false or misleading in a material respect .... "); 17 C.F.R. § 230.408(a) ("In addition to
the information expressly required to be included in a registration statement, there shall be
added such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.").
109. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 102,
100 Stat. 3416 (1996).
110. See generally SELIGMAN, supra note 18.
111. See Nagy, supra note 21, at 986-87.
112. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14 (2009) ("Certification of Disclosure in Annual and Quar-
terly Reports").
113. See Nagy, supra note 21, at 979 (discussing the PCAOB's "ambiguous status" as an
accounting regulator). Although the PCAOB governs auditing standards rather than ac-
counting principles and was specifically created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, there
are "New Governance" features in common that stem from not operating as an agency of the
government. Professor Nagy criticizes "negotiated rulemaking," but the issue of whether
New Governance and related methods implement the best policy is secondary to determin-
ing the extent to which New Governance methods are implemented. See id. at 1030.
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New Governance model, where stakeholder participation and dissemination
of information are permitted to the maximum extent possible.
1. International Financial Reporting Standards
The implementation of multiple regulatory systems that serve one uni-
form function can be accurately described as wasteful to the extent that
having additional systems impose regulatory costs without producing bene-
fits in line with the added costs. 114 Precisely to avoid such redundant costs
(both for regulated entities and for government) without added benefit, the
securities laws have been interpreted such that exemptions from certain
administrative requirements are appropriate where there exists an alterna-
tive system of regulation." 5 There are standards very different from U.S.
GAAP on the global level, which are set by the International Accounting
Standards Board ("IASB") and referred to as the International Financial
Reporting Standards ("IFRS").' 16 The primary focus of this Note is the
administrative law and policy decisions which govern how substantive
rules are created, rather than the substantive rules themselves. Unlike
FASB which derives its authority from the SEC, the IASB is an outgrowth
of a standards setting body called the International Accounting Standards
Committee Foundation, which oversees the IASB and provides funding.11 7
A New Governance analysis of the IASB itself as a non- or quasi-
governmental organization is beyond the scope of this Note; for purposes
of analyzing the possible New Governance implications of permitting IFRS
reporting by American securities issuers, it is sufficient to understand the
IFRS as a system of norms that could redefine the disclosure responsibili-
ties that securities issuers have to their investors and as a system not within
the sole control of the U.S. government. Proposals to permit foreign bod-
114. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14 (on multiplicity).
115. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990) ("[W]e examine whether some
factor such as the existence of another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of
the instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary.") (citing
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557-59 (1982)). But see SEC v. Wallenbrock, 313
F.3d 532, 540 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he existence of limited alternative regulatory enforce-
ment mechanisms does not obviate the need for the protection of the Securities Acts ...
[aInd a patchwork of state regulation, which applies to most business entities in some fash-
ion or another, cannot displace the federal regime.").
116. Welcome to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB),
http://www.iasb.org (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
117. International Accounting Standards Board - About Us, http://www.iasb.org/About+
Us/Intemational+Accounting+Standards+Board+-+About+Ushtm (last visited Oct. 20,
2009); see also Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accor-
dance With International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, 73 Fed. Reg.
70,816, 70,821-22 (Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter "Roadmap"].
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ies, regardless of how these bodies themselves shape policy, to shape U.S.
financial disclosure policy represents a shift from a system of political ac-
countability to a system of stakeholder accountability that may be best un-
derstood from a New Governance perspective." 8
The SEC has, in the past, taken measures to accommodate foreign issu-
ers of securities. Regulations issued by the SEC have exempted foreign is-
suers from certain registration requirements that apply to U.S. issuers,119
and the SEC established an Office of International Affairs "[c]harged to
promote investor protection in the global capital market by advancing in-
ternational regulatory and enforcement cooperation. '"120 As noted above,
the securities laws of the U.S. have generally been understood as providing
an exemption for situations where there is an alternative regulatory scheme,
especially where such an alternative system is more targeted to a particular
regulatory problem.' 21
A very different kind of proposal is embodied in the SEC Proposed
Rule, "Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in
Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issu-
ers." 122 The proposed rule establishes a fairly long-term and gradual transi-
tion to permitting the use of IFRS by U.S. companies, 123 and a major stated
policy motivation for allowing U.S. issuers to use IFRS is that "[a]s trading
and investment become more global, investors face an increasing need for
full, fair and reliable disclosure that enables comparison of financial infor-
mation across investment alternatives that cross national boundaries."'' 24 In
addition to this investor-protection rationale, the SEC also states that "capi-
tal formation . . . would be enhanced if the world's major capital markets
118. See Roadmap, supra note 117, at 70,827 ("A change to commit U.S. reporting to
following IFRS would include a change in the relationship of the U.S. capital markets to the
accounting standard setting process. The IASB and its related organizations include mem-
bers from a number of countries. The IASB is expected to be responsible to broad, world-
wide constituencies of investors .... These constituencies can be expected to represent a
wide range of interests, reflecting varying economic, social, and political environments.").
119. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (2009) ("Exemption from Sections 14(a), 14(b),
14(c), 14(f), and 15 for Securities for Certain Foreign Issuers").
120. Ahdieh, supra note 4, at 879 (citations omitted).
121. See generally United Hous. Found. Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (finding
that the sale of units in a public housing development were not securities despite some ex-
pectation of future benefit to the purchaser).
122. Roadmap, supra note 117.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 70,818; see also Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Chairman's Address to the
SEC Roundtable on International Financial Reporting Standards (Mar. 6, 2007),
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030607cc.htm.
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all operated under a single set of high-quality accounting standards."' 125
The proposed rule strongly implies that the SEC views achieving one as not
mutually exclusive of achieving the other, a feature that is conducive to
New Governance solutions.
The proposed rule details the history of interactions between the FASB
and the IASB and the development and growth of the IASB as a "potential.
• . set of accounting standards that [could] best provide a common platform
on which companies can report and investors can compare financial infor-
mation."' 126 The rule's central proposal is to "allow certain U.S. issuers that
meet specific criteria to file financial statements in accordance with IFRS
as issued by the IASB, rather than U.S. GAAP" to meet various require-
ments under the '33 Act and the '34 Act.'27 There are two approaches con-
templated in the proposed rule: Proposal A, under which a "U.S. issuer that
elects to file IFRS financial statements would provide the reconciling in-
formation from U.S. GAAP to IFRS called for under IFRS 1,''128 and Pro-
posal B, under which such issuers would also have to "disclose on an an-
nual basis certain unaudited supplemental U.S. GAAP financial
information covering a three-year period.' l2 9 The central issue the SEC
would face in deciding between these two different methods of implemen-
tation is the extent to which additional reconciliation would be useful for
investors in the transition period.130 The resolution of this question de-
pends on the extent to which investors rely on publicly disclosed reports in
forming investment decisions. Regardless of whether or not individuals
would be able to use the financial information in the short run, the pro-
posed rule implicitly contemplates the long-term shift of all companies to
using IFRS. This is demonstrated primarily through its advocacy of in-
creased comparability between American securities issuers and those of
other countries that utilize IFRS. The rule itself is limited to issuers that
meet the eligibility requirements of the proposed rule,' 3' but overall com-
parability between American companies would be reduced in the long run
if some used IFRS while others used U.S. GAAP. From an investor-
protection standpoint, this proposed rule is only reasonable as part of a lar-
ger phase-in of IFRS, because investors are concerned with comparing in-
vestments against a full range of other investment opportunities, and not
125. Roadmap, supra note 117, at 70,818.
126. Id. at 70,818-20.
127. Id. at 70,828.
128. Id. at 70,832.
129. Id. at 70,833.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 70,828-30.
936 [Vol. XXXVI
NEW GOVERNANCE AND SECURITIES
simply companies within one specific industry. Based on the qualifications
under the proposed rule, "only a limited number of U.S. issuers would be
eligible" to report using IFRS. 132 Again, the proposed rule standing alone
may enhance comparability with so-called "IFRS industries," but could
also reduce comparability with other U.S. issuers in the long term unless
the SEC institutes a more permanent shift in policy towards pervasive im-
plementation of IFRS.
The proposed rule, though advocating increased usage of IFRS, does not
uncritically adopt IFRS as it presently exists. On the contrary, the pro-
posed rule notes that "IFRS is not as developed as U.S. GAAP in certain
areas" and that "U.S. GAAP has been used longer and more extensively
than IFRS.' 33  While these critiques are significantly mitigated by the
SEC's assertion that this lack of development in prescriptive guidance is an
asset in some respects, particularly in the need for accounting to reflect
"underlying economics," 134 the administrative law concerns of determining
the rights and responsibilities of U.S. citizens by a collection of committees
that reflect foreign input, rather than domestic political decisions, are
strengthened further by the SEC's admission that IFRS is not as mature as
U.S. GAAP, despite the possible problems caused by incomparability of
various company's securities under the current rules.
In The SEC's Global Accounting Vision, Lawrence Cunningham
strongly criticizes the SEC's claims of the benefits of moving to IFRS.1 35
Just as legislative proposals favoring a reasonability standard serve as a
counterweight to efforts to implement say on pay strategies in the field of
executive compensation, Cunningham's critiques present an alternative to
the views expressed in the SEC's proposed rule. While the central criti-
cism of Cunningham's piece is that the SEC's financial reporting plan is
"Quixotic," he makes four criticisms: 1) competing standards will not en-
hance comparability; 2) a single standard itself might not guarantee compa-
rability; 3) U.S. adoption of IFRS will be costly and complicated; and 4)
the transition to IFRS will not necessarily benefit investors.136 The New
Governance model, as a descriptive matter, suggests that experimentalism
in policy is preferential to ex ante determinations about regulatory effi-
ciency. Cunningham's first three criticisms, while possibly well-grounded,
132. Id. at 70,829.
133. Id. at 70,833.
134. Id. at 70,826.
135. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC's Accounting Vision: A Realistic
Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1 (2008).
136. Id. at4.
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are of limited applicability when analyzing competing policy proposals in
light of New Governance theory, and in any case, whether or not competi-
tion or moving to IFRS will enhance comparability in the long run is ulti-
mately an empirical question that could not be resolved as a theoretical
matter. Cunningham's fourth criticism, however, presents compelling ar-
guments in favor of maintaining U.S. GAAP in order to maintain the tradi-
tional investor-protection principles of the U.S. securities regulatory sys-
tem.
For Cunningham, whether the SEC's adoption of IFRS would be an ad-
vance for investors depends on whether the SEC takes the "endorsement"
approach adopted by the European Union or the "deference" approach,
which would make IASB pronouncements "binding" without formal adop-
tion by a sovereign authority. 137 The distinction is important because while
the SEC and FASB have worked over the years to develop a system of pol-
icy formation in which FASB "avowed adherence to a model of public re-
sponsiveness," the "references to investor interests in IASB policy state-
ments equivocate."' 138 Although the SEC's argument that the securities
markets of the United States are increasingly intertwined with foreign mar-
kets may be factually accurate, Cunningham does not accept that the only
logical policy decision is to move over to IFRS. Cunningham does not pre-
sent a complete, alternative system and concludes that "[t]he most impor-
tant concrete step is for the SEC to provide public evaluation of the chal-
lenges identified . . . to which it has currently given scant or no
attention."' 39 In addition, he reveals a potential danger, particularly with
regard to its concerns about the different importance of investor protection
in the two accounting systems, that could stem from the total removal of a
regulatory scheme from political accountability by implementing New
Governance solutions.
2. The SEC's XBRL Initiative
Integral to the discussion of financial reporting are the regulations gov-
erning the presentation of the data, because the central goal is to get infor-
mation to investors in a fashion that they can understand. The SEC has
been moving consistently toward increased transparency in both its sub-
stantive standards and data format. In July 2005, a series of regulatory re-
forms altered the responsibilities of issuers and brokers to disseminate fi-
137. Id. at 58.
138. Id. at 62-63.
139. Id. at 80-81.
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nancial information: the basic mantra was that "access equals delivery."140
Essentially replacing prior statutory mandates that issuers or brokers must
deliver registration materials in the form of a "prospectus," these reforms
allow the dissemination of information, typically a World Wide Web ad-
dress, where such information can be obtained instead of the prospectus it-
self.141 As with all regulatory regimes, there are exceptions to this more
permissive rule, but the import is to incentivize posting of filing informa-
tion on the World Wide Web in addition to the EDGAR database main-
tained by the SEC that is publicly accessible. The SEC's new initiative to
force usage of the eXtensible Business Reporting Language ("XBRL") is
intended to further enhance the ability of investors to utilize financial in-
formation.
The SEC's final rule, "Interactive Data to Improve Financial Reporting"
replaces the old EDGAR filing system with a new system, called the Inter-
active Data Electronic Applications ("IDEA") intended to "facilitate the
use and analysis of information submitted to the Commission in interactive
data format.' 142 Unlike such regulatory policies as executive compensation
or accounting standards, the SEC's implementation of an interactive data
filing scheme has little opportunity for altering substantive business deci-
sions, but could expand the ability of investors to automate and thus refine
evaluation of an issuer's SEC filings. In its final rule release, the SEC
identifies one concrete and immediate benefit of mandatory XBRL imple-
mentation: those investors who currently pay others to perform data aggre-
gation tasks now no longer need to incur such costs. 143 More importantly,
however, the XBRL-based system will apply both to those using the report-
ing requirements of U.S. GAAP and IFRS, and therefore could serve as an
important tool during the transition period between the two accounting sys-
tems. 144 The final rule contains a phase-in that mandates when particular
filers must begin filing in the IDEA system based on the size of the filer. 145
140. Securities Offering Reform, Release 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,783 (Aug. 3,
2005) ("At this time, we believe that Internet usage has increased sufficiently to allow us to
adopt a final prospectus delivery model for issuers and their intermediaries that relies on
timely access to filed information and documents.").
141. SEC Delivery of Prospectuses, 17 C.F.R. § 230.172 (2005).
142. Interactive Data to Improve Financial Reporting, Release 33-9002, 74 Fed. Reg.
6,776, 6,777 (Feb. 10, 2009).
143. See id.
144. See id. at 6,779; see also Roadmap, supra note 117, at 70,816.
145. Interactive Data to Improve Financial Reporting, 74 Fed. Reg. at 6,780.
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11. WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF NEW GOVERNANCE
PROGRAMS
Part III of this Note assesses the extent to which each of the described
policy changes demonstrates values accepted by New Governance scholars
and then addresses the costs and benefits of New Governance in light of
traditional legal principles, such as the rule of law and due process. Fi-
nally, Part III advances the position that while caution should be applied in
the executive compensation and primary regulator context, application of
New Governance principles is best suited at this time to the financial re-
porting context.
A. Applying a New Governance Framework
The extent to which the policy proposals discussed above reflect New
Governance values varies. Although topics like executive compensation
and financial reporting standards both implicate the rights of shareholders
to make informed investment decisions, the proposed solutions do not all
fully reflect the emerging values of New Governance theory. This Part will
analyze all of these proposals in light of the four-factor New Governance
definition put forth by Abbott and Snidal: 1) decentralization of "actors and
institutions, public and private, into the regulatory system;" 2) reliance on
decentralized actors for regulatory expertise; 3) "orchestration ... rather
than promulgation and enforcement of rules;" and 4) use of "soft law" over
"hard law."' 146 With the exception of the substantive regulation of execu-
tive wages under a reasonability standard, the policy proposals discussed
generally represent the decentralization of actors and institutions. 147 The
substantive regulation of executive wages may be preferable to the share-
holders in the short-term, but sets a dangerous precedent where their in-
vestment decisions as a shareholder group are limited in terms of their abil-
ity to seek talented management. From a New Governance perspective,
allowing the federal government to set executive compensation would be
unlikely to result in a temporary exercise of such power. Furthermore, the
implementation of at least one legislative proposal, H.R. 1586, would im-
plement a hard law tax regime as a means of enforcement, as opposed to
the soft law advisory vote contemplated under the Frank-Obama bill.
148
Viewing say on pay legislation and reasonable compensation legislation
as two possible but mutually exclusive routes highlights the New Govern-
146. Abbot & Snidal, supra note 14, at 5.
147. See id.
148. See An Act to Impose an Additional Tax on Bonuses Received by Certain TARP
Recipients, H.R. 1586, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
[Vol. XX-XVI940
NEW GOVERNANCE AND SECURITIES
ance features that the Frank-Obama Bill possesses. The advantage of say
on pay from a New Governance perspective is limited, however, by the fact
that it still represents a federal government's incursion on the corporate
governance sphere traditionally left to state law. The main difference-
from a New Governance perspective-between state law good faith analy-
sis of executive compensation and say on pay legislation, is that say on pay
is more centralized and soft, while state law regulation has the potential to
direct hard enforcement, albeit on the state level. Although both regulatory
systems may work together, they could possibly be eclipsed by federal pre-
emption of state law through substantive reasonable compensation legisla-
tion.
As opposed to executive compensation, financial reporting requirements
present a stronger case for adding New Governance principles into the se-
curities regulation framework. Despite Cunningham's protests that the
SEC may be moving too quickly, it is undeniable that permitting a global
constituency to help the SEC shape accounting principles will bring more
people to the table overall; even Cunningham did not challenge the basic
premise that the securities market has become global. In the context of im-
plementing IFRS, the second element of the Abbott/Snidal definition of
New Governance blends into the first, but the third and fourth factors are
distinct. Unlike GAAP, IFRS generally embraces principles-based regula-
tion, and in a 2007 speech, Chairman Cox discussed the mandate that Sar-
banes-Oxley had given the SEC in taking the first steps towards imple-
menting such principles-based regulations. 149  These principles-based
accounting standards will result in a movement towards orchestration and
away from the rules-based accounting standards encompassed in U.S.
GAAP. The implementation of XBRL presents the most straightforward
New Governance solution because it is a technology with which the SEC
has experimented, soliciting high levels of stakeholder (issuer and investor)
feedback, 5 ° and most importantly is entirely a soft law policy designed to
help create a common data format that all investors can use in a more effi-
cient manner. XBRL may lead to more informed investor decisions and
help weed out poorly-performing companies or managers, thus potentially
mitigating the extent to which politicization of executive compensation is
necessary to ensure that compensation is actually taking place in a competi-
tive market. Because the essence of the XBRL development is wide dis-
closure, it necessarily enlists a broader group of investors in the process of
evaluating issuer information.
149. Cox, supra note 124.
150. Interactive Data to Improve Financial Reporting, 74 Fed. Reg. at 6,777.
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B. External Costs/Costs to Legal Principles
The Constitutional and contract-law implications of executive compen-
sation regulation are complicated. Due process jurisprudence gives the
government significant leeway in the regulation of contract formation since
the decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,'5 ' which overturned the prior
Lochner v. New York'52 decision creating a substantive due process-based
contract right. For executives who take a job or sign a contract after sub-
stantive compensation legislation passes, the current case law would not
weigh heavily on the side of finding a violation by Congress or the SEC.
Shareholders are more likely to have sympathetic claims, especially where
the federal government refuses to allow their particular executive to be paid
a certain amount of money and they lose profits as a result. Although the
Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary's designee would be unlikely to
declare a given executive overpaid if there was compelling evidence that
shareholders were not disturbed by the level of compensation offered, the
problem with centralized regulatory techniques is that one particular gov-
ernment official may not have access to all available information or may
make administrative decisions tainted by political influence.
XBRL and the enrichment of content has no impact on traditional legal
values such as due process or fairness because the SEC's initiative merely
alters the content of submissions already required under the securities laws,
and because there is unlikely to be an exorbitant increase in cost for issu-
ers. 153 The delegation of responsibility for generating accounting standards
to the IASB, however, could result in an alteration of the understanding of
the SEC as an agency of the U.S. government intended to protect United
States investors and regulated U.S. securities. This problem could be
avoided to a large extent if the SEC chooses the endorsement adoption
method, under which it would have to ratify standards, but such a path
would diminish the primary policy argument in favor of IFRS reflected in
the proposed rule: the establishment of a global accounting system. As-
suming the endorsement model is not taken by the SEC, the problem could
also be avoided if the procedures of the IASB were held to satisfy any due
process rights that might arise from the issuance of rules governing U.S.
citizens' conduct by international non-governmental organizations that are
not bound by the constraints and motivations underlying the federal securi-
ties laws.
151. 300 U.S. 379, 406 (1937).
152. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
153. Interactive Data to Improve Financial Reporting, 74 Fed. Reg. at 6,777.
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C. The Use of New Governance Strategies Is Crucial in the Financial
Reporting Context
In describing the need for changes in securities law, former SEC Chair-
man Harvey Pitt described three "key components" of effectiveness as the
primary reference of regulatory objectives: 1) transparency; 2) international
comparability (prevention of regulatory arbitrage); and 3) global accom-
modations.154 Chairman Pitt's description did not use the term New Gov-
ernance, but his key components of a successful potential regulatory
scheme have significant overlap with the goals of New Governance theory.
While merely an incremental change rather than a complete overhaul of the
regulatory system is advocated in documents like the Treasury's "white pa-
per," '55 the implementation of XBRL as a standard language for communi-
cating financial data is likely to address the three key components when it
becomes widely used and adopted. Although current laws require disclo-
sure of financial information, this disclosure takes the form of long and
complicated documents that do not reflect the state of the art in information
technology. In permitting the tagging of financial information in filings,
the SEC's XBRL initiative will allow more rapid flow of information that
was once effectively buried in the paper upon which it was written. This
transparency is valuable not merely in that it will help American investors
understand and compare the securities in which they invest, but it will also
help bridge the gap between U.S. GAAP and IFRS accounting standards, if
a total transition is indeed ahead. The ability to manipulate and focus on
data that is made freely available with XBRL will allow fluid transition
from one set of accounting principles to another (at least within the SEC's
phase-in window). Finally, by easing the transition to IFRS, XBRL facili-
tates global comparability, even though its implementation alone would not
achieve this goal.
CONCLUSION
The defining characteristic of New Governance is that no regulation
should be held sacred. A rule has the power to influence institutions and
individuals only when it is based on consensus among a community with a
shared interest in having certain conduct regulated. New Governance is not
about enlarging or shrinking the government or any specific interest group;
it is about expanding the notion of what the government can (help) accom-
plish by imposing procedural requirements on areas of interaction that were
154. Pitt, supra note 1, at 319-20.
155. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 46, at 2-4.
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previously governed solely by custom or the market. New Governance is
also valuable for what it tells us about old government institutions: the ex-
tent to which an old government institution can maintain consensus around
certain laws will depend primarily on whether there is consensus behind
both the conceptual norm and how the government implements it. By nar-
rowly focusing the government's regulatory activities on areas firmly in-
side its institutional competence (i.e., ensuring procedural rights, rather
than substantive regulations) the government can harness the energy of the
markets, rather than merely restraining them. Of all the regulatory propos-
als discussed in this paper, the reform in financial reporting through the de-
velopment and use of XBRL as a data standard represents the most pure
implementation of the openness and experimentalism to which much New
Governance theory aspires.
